There is a middle ground
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Compatibilism or soft determinism
Compatibilists believe that determinism and free will are compatible.
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“Compatibilism isn’t easy to explain. But it seems to jibe with our gut instinct.” In this deterministic universe, is it possible for a person to be fully morally responsible for their actions? Compatibilism is an explanation that seems illogical, but argues that although your actions and choices are predetermined, that does not mean you’re not free. Free will can exist even if determinism is true, as determinism is not absolute. The universe operates with law-like order, and past actions determine the future. But, there is also something different about some human actions and some of the actions we take are really free. So, if we ask whether a person jumps off a diving board or is pushed, in both cases the action is determined - it couldn’t not happen. But when the action of an agent is self-determined (e.g. they choose to jump), the action should be considered free. Alternatively, if we cannot separate external and internal causes, maybe the answer is to say actions are more or less free? Patricia Churchland rejects the free/not free dichotomy but instead says we should ask not ‘do I have control?’ but ‘how much control do I have?’ This combines the determinist nature of the universe with the feeling of being free. The philosophical implications could be that “when one forms an intention to act, one is significantly disposed to act but not yet fully committed. The commitment comes when one finally decides to act." Evolution, history and culture have endowed us with feedback systems that give us the unique ability to reflect and think things over and to imagine the future. Free will and determinism can co-exist.
[P1] While behaviour is predetermined, this is compatible with individuals also having free will.
Rejecting the premises
Kane, R. (2016). The complex tapestry of free will: Striving will, indeterminism and volitional streams. Synthese 1–16.