Terrorism is justified in the cases of supreme emergency and moral disaster
When a supreme emergency or moral disaster exists, the price of not resorting to terrorism may be so weighty as to override those of justice and rights. In such cases, terrorism is justified.
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Extreme cases may require the use of terrorism. Such extreme cases occur when there is a supreme emergency or a possibility of a moral disaster. A supreme emergency is a circumstance in which dangers are so imminent that there are no alternative means to use to counteract the threat. A moral disaster is an imminent threat of extermination or ethnic cleansing of an entire people. Under such circumstances, even civilians are permissible targets. Philosopher and political theorist Michael Walzer offers an exemplification of this argument in his discussion of the terror bombing of German cities by the British during World War II. In early 1942, Britain seemed to be defeated by German Nazi forces. Considering Nazism as a “murderous and degrading ideology”, Britain was facing a supreme emergency –an imminent threat of something utterly unthinkable from a moral point of view. In such an emergency, one may breach a basic moral principle such as civilian immunity. By early 1943, it was clear that Germany was not going to win the war. Hence, all subsequent terror bombing lacked moral justification. It is necessary to clarify that Britain was facing two supreme emergencies: suffering the fate the Nazis had in store for people they considered racially inferior and having their polity broken apart. The first emergency is a political disaster, whereas the latter is a moral disaster. The British bombings were justified only due to the moral disaster –where an entire people was subjected to an attempt at ethnic cleansing. Overall, terrorism can be used if a group faces a supreme emergency. However, to justify this terrorism, the supreme emergency needs to include the possibility of a moral disaster in the case of no action.
Walzer’s concept of a supreme emergency is unclear and vague. It is very hard to distinguish genuine supreme emergencies from other cases in which threats of terrible destruction and damage exist but do not justify terrorism. Is a threat of mass enslavement or extermination a necessary feature of any supreme emergency? Or can other threats to civilized values qualify? Or could there be enslavements and exterminations that do not threaten civilized values? These questions all weaken the theory of supreme emergencies. The example in the argument about the British bombings of German cities does not constitute a supreme emergency that could justify the terror. Britain, as a whole, never faced a threat of enslavement or extermination. While the Nazis explicitly sought to exterminate Jews and enslave Slavs, they took no steps to enslave or exterminate the French or the Scandinavians. Their racist ideology provided no reason to think that genocide or enslavement awaited the British. Therefore, Britain only faced a supreme emergency of political disaster and not one of a moral disaster. Even if the British example is assumed to be valid, supreme emergencies are extremely rare. It is not a familiar principle that people understand and know how to apply. There is no evidence that people involved in the World War II city bombings thought in this way. Had they reasoned as Walzer does, they would have stopped city bombings when the supreme emergency was over.