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Which is the best voting system?
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The "winner-takes-all" system is the most efficient voting system

Alternative voting methods such as ranked-choice or approval voting can require several rounds before determining a winner. The "winner-takes-all" system is the most efficient, eliminating room for more nuances in an already complicated system.
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The Argument

The winner-takes-all system is the most efficient voting system. The process abides by the logical tenet that the candidate who receives the most votes receives the regional representation. As the candidate with the most votes represents a majority of the public’s opinion, they win all of the votes in that area. [1] Alternative voting systems, especially the ranked-choice and approval voting systems, can become overly complicated with too many candidates. On the other hand, the winner-takes-all system limits the process with a maximum of two candidates. A fewer number of candidates means less time, less room for error, and an overall simpler and more efficient election. [2] The winner-takes-all system gives all votes to one of two candidates. Due to its efficiency, the winner-takes-all system is the best voting system for elections.

Counter arguments

The winner-takes-all system limits the election to two candidates. Women, people of color, and other historically underrepresented groups have little say in winner-takes-all systems because they are not the majority. Winner-takes-all systems benefit the majority opinion while disregarding the minorities.[1] In addition, the winner-takes-all system contributes to lower voter turnout. With an election restricted to two candidates, people may not be inclined to vote if neither candidate appeals to them. A democracy should encourage voter turnout, not lower it, so the winner-takes-all system should not be used. [1]

Proponents

Premises

Rejecting the premises

References

  1. https://www.representwomen.org/winner_take_all
  2. https://archive.fairvote.org/factshts/wta-va.htm
This page was last edited on Monday, 26 Oct 2020 at 07:14 UTC