**TL;DR – Some interventions work, others are catastrophes** Humanitarian intervention is a difficult topic to encapsulate; it involves one state using force against another in order to improve the latter's human rights condition. It is somewhat ambiguous what these human rights violations must be and how the force will manifest. The modern justification for humanitarian interventions primarily comes from _Responsibility to Protect_ (R2P) doctrine, [adopted by the United Nations](https://www.un.org/womenwatch/ods/A-RES-60-1-E.pdf) in 2005—although, it should be noted, United Nations policies are often quite murky and difficult to enforce. Both before and after this, there have been many examples of humanitarian interventions. It would be impossible to give an exhaustive list, but there are certain prime examples of _both_ successful and failed interventions which should be noted. The 2011 UN-backed armed intervention to mitigate the alleged war crimes of Libya's Gaddafi is most likely the first example that comes to mind when individuals think of failed interventions (or, possibly, interventions at large). Debatably, this operation was, overall, a failure. While Gaddafi was deposed (a main NATO goal), the intervention led to immense destabilization and the country quickly descended into its bloody Second Civil War; the intervention, to cease civilian deaths and abuses, is widely viewed as having ultimately caused _more_ civilian deaths and abuses. This example is not to say that _all_ interventions have similar trajectories (although many, particularly the United States', have). More successful interventions often are less publicized as there is little outrage and reason for media attention. The UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire is widely viewed as successful; although it lasted many years, its goal of ending the violence of the Second Ivorian Civil War and facilitating the removal of would-be dictator Laurent Gbagbo and installation of the democratically-elected Alassane Ouattara was ultimately achieved. Although there was significant violence through the operation's tenure, the UN suppressed it rather than partaking in it, which—as proved by the Libyan case—can result in societal instability. It is misleading to say humanitarian intervention doesn't work outright, but it is surely an incredibly risky measure in any case. It is also possible that humanitarian interventions are _usually_ taken on in a damaging way (and possibly with poor motives), but they _is_ some potential for them, and it is difficult to argue that the international community _shouldn't_ act when such terrible acts as genocide and war crimes are occurring.

**TL;DR – Great in theory. Not so great in practice.** Drawing on the ideas of Hugo Grotius and the general concept of natural rights, [humanitarian intervention](https://www.e-ir.info/2012/02/06/humanitarian-intervention-a-legal-analysis/) seeks to justify foreign intervention in a state that is perceived to be conducting human rights abuses against its citizens, or is unable or unwilling to prevent such abuses. This is also expressed by the [Responsibility to Protect principle](https://una.org.uk/r2p-detail) which was unanimously endorsed by the UN member states at the 2005 World Summit. Whilst its supporters argue that it is good for promoting liberal values globally, it can be criticised for not working in the way that it _should_: • Military intervention to topple a tyrannical state has often led to more widespread instability, insurgency and anarchy because there is [rarely a plan for post-invasion](https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A37468-2003Jul23.html). Such examples include the aftermath of NATO’s interventions in Iraq, Libya and Syria. • Humanitarian intervention can be perceived as a guise for Western imperialism. For example, NATO’s decision to go forward with the Iraq War in 2003 without the consent of the UN was criticised by Middle Eastern nations who viewed this as an attempt to advance the Western agenda in the region. Conversely, where states are of little interest politically and economically to the West, there is less urgency to act when human rights abuses _do_ occur, a key example being the UN’s passivity during the [1994 Rwandan genocide](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-26917419). Ultimately, humanitarian intervention has the potential to be very effective. However, so long as states continue to use this principle to protect their own interests and fail to adequately plan for the post-invasion period, then the extent to which the principle can be adequately applied is hindered.

**Humanitarian intervention won’t stop a war, but it could prevent it.** Humanitarian intervention is not to be used as a last ditch effort, or as the ‘Hail Mary’ of warfare. It is, however, a great tactic employed in preventing a ['domino effect'](https://www.e-ir.info/2019/03/16/walking-a-fine-line-the-pros-and-cons-of-humanitarian-intervention/) from occurring. Through calculated humanitarian mediation, we're able to calm tensions in circumstances that call for a non-traditional military response. However, participation on a local level is vital to [successful humanitarian intervention](https://www.humanityinaction.org/knowledge_detail/the-limits-of-humanitarian-military-interventions-innovation-and-transformation-in-the-age-of-complexity/). So while humanitarian intervention is geared towards smaller scale strife, it doesn't diminish its capacity to achieve peace, or its ability to stop widespread anarchy that cause long-lasting issues.