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Turi: Today, we’re thrilled to be talking to Timothy Garton Nash. Timothy is professor of European studies at the university of Oxford and a senior fellow at the Hoover institution at Stanford. He’s also the author of 10 books of history, including his latest, a new edition of the magic lantern about the revolution of 1989.
We’ve known each other many years and last came together to discuss Timothy’s multi-year and multi-country project around freedom of speech, which is called free speech debate. Links in the show notes, but today we want to talk about Timothy’s recent long essay in prospect magazine, which came out just before Christmas, on the future of liberalism, a sort of manifesto for the renewal of liberalism.
In it,Timothy you argued that liberalism was under some threat, both at home, inside Western liberal democracies and abroad. In the context of China’s growing developmental authoritarianism, as you called it, you also propose some solutions for. Combating those threats. That’s I think what we want to get into today, but can I ask you quickly just before we kick off, so define in broadest possible terms, what you mean by liberalism, and then we can perhaps look at how, um, the threats that it’s under
Timothy Garton Ash: liberalism is a very broad tradition of both theory and practice built around the central idea of freedom of individual.
Liberty, the clue is in the name. And it is, as I say, in the essay, I kind of treasure trove and experimental history of multiple different ways of trying to maximize individual Liberty in a given society. Um, so it’s a very rich and broad tradition, but more recently we’ve often used the term. In what I call small L liberalism to be those things that liberal democracies have in common.
So in this sense, it’s not just people called big L liberals. You can have liberal conservatives and liberal social Democrats, liberal Christians and liberal secularists
Turi: understood. There’s a long history of liberalism. You describe this liberalism in a broad, broad terms. Can we talk a little bit about where you think these threats are coming from?
Timothy Garton Ash: Indeed. Um, I think that there are three dimensions to it. One is that as we all know, we live in what is quite likely to be the Chinese century. There is a. New superpower, which has an alternative model of modality and authoritarian model of modernity and several other authoritarian powers around the world.
Secondly, there’s what I would call the anti liberal counter revolution in much of the world. We had 20, 25 years. Since 1989, since the fall of the Berlin wall of what I would call liberal revolution. And now, and so often happens in history. You have the counter revolution, the forces that feel excluded, uh, reduced frightened.
And then the third component, which whichever was strengthens. The counter revolution is the actual failing. Of the liberalism or what has passed for liberalism over the last set of years, but to a significant degree. And I think , Hey, um, this is not a problem of our failures in a sense, it’s a problem of our successes.
W w what I mean by that is, is that’s the fall of the Berlin wall. Didn’t just open the door to the transition, to free markets, some version of multi-party democracy, pluralism, civil society, and so on in Eastern Europe, it actually opened the door to a. A worldwide way of globalization and liberalization, the two of them going together and that wave spread very wide deep into the former Soviet union, into Asia, into Africa and to Latin America, such that 10 years ago, we had more liberal democracies in the world than ever before in history. That’s what I mean by that. The liberal revolution. And
Turi: in that context, therefore, a backlash one, perhaps that liberal power itself overreaches itself. And to that, it meant that in many, as we see across Western Europe, but as we see this across many other different parts of the world as well, that backlash against, um, against the success of, of the speed and the speed of the success of liberal democracy, leaving large gaps in its week. Is that what you’re describing?
Timothy Garton Ash: That’s exactly right. And it’s positive because. Capitalism and particularly the globalized financial capitalism we had in the 1990s and two thousands, which of course also led us into the financial crash of 2000 of age was a revolutionary force as, as Karl Marx himself described. I mean, it changed people’s lives very quickly and very fundamentally. And part of the. Of the reaction report and the little literal sentence, the counter revolutionary path. If people say too much too fast, this is all going. I I’m, I’m, I’m losing my bearings. I didn’t recognize my country anymore. And reaching back to old familiar identities around the nation, the church, the family tradition, um, that’s part of the story, but another part of the story is.
That this was actually a one-dimensional liberalism. It was economic liberalism markets as a solution for everything, not as market economy, but markets, society, and neglected the cultural, the social. And to some extent the political dimensions of liberalism,
Turi: you have a wonderful quote. Bye Mary Shelley and your articles says something like nothing is so painful to the human mind as a great and sudden change.
The one, the one novel I read and it’s perhaps more a memoir than a novel, in fact, it’s called memoirs of an anti-Semite and it’s the only piece of it. Right. And that has made me actually understand perhaps more even empathize with that antisemitic current in yeah. Um, post first world war, uh, central and Eastern Europe.
Again, describing a moment in history in which everything was washed away, huge gaps of meaning and purpose and order emerge across the social landscape and a desperate return or desperate yearning for a calm, a time of 800 years of HubSpot empire in that instance.
Timothy Garton Ash: Yeah. It’s a wonderful book, Greg. A fun read. Sorry. Great book.
Turi: Wonderful book. Exactly. Are we in some similar moment today or have we been in some similar moment today? For the last 10 years or so,
Timothy Garton Ash: I, we haven’t just had a world war and that’s an important point. Uh, so history doesn’t repeat itself, but it sometimes rhymes. Um, I think that we are in a moment where something that we thought finished for good.
After 1945, namely far right movements. Um, something that is, if not fascist, proto, fascist, uh, is making a very uncomfortable. Comeback. Uh, and to that extent, um, you know, I, I think there is, there is an element of repetition is I think one other dimension of this is really worth mentioning because everyone now talks about inequality and they saved the Gini coefficient.
And they’re talking about income inequality, but it’s not just. Economic. If you look at the way inequality plays out, it’s geographical. It’s a North of England. It’s the rust belt in the U S it’s a poorer Southeast of Poland. It’s East Germany. And it’s. Cultural. It’s a great divide in our society between people who have higher education and people who didn’t, by the way, one of the best predictors of who voted for and against Brexit who voted for or against Trump.
So it’s, it’s multiple forms of divide opening up in our society, not just economic and here, the idea, the core idea would be that, um, liberalism. In its sort of brutish, purely economic sense, which was the most successful export of liberalism over the last 20 years, exacerbated these underlying inequalities across society.
And, um, my accelerating by, um, by massively stimulating, um, those inequalities have led to a return to, as you say, these. Very uncomfortable, frightening echoes of, of, uh, the first half of the 20th century is politics. Yeah. It’s not just the revolutionary force of what is conventionally called neoliberalism more, you know, free markets for everything.
There’s an aspect, which is very much present in liberalism, which is a value it places on, uh, education. On, uh, merit. And the problem is that what was originally a Mensa Patri idea, let’s get more and more of our kids into education, and that will make them, you know, not only better educated, but better people and enhance social mobility and actually make it in many ways, a more equal society has ended up.
Almost dividing Austin. Assata’s in two halls, roughly one half that’s gone to university. John can live in the big city is cosmopolitan. Metropolitan loves traveling, embraces globalization, and the half that’s left behind, um, in post-industrial cities or small towns or the rust belt or wherever it may be without higher education.
And. Within that there was an element of, and I’m now going to use a rather unfamiliar term, but it’s quite a useful one. Epistocratic contempt. So epistocracy is the rule of the knowledgeable, the rule of the educated and in a phrase like Hillary Clinton, notorious love basket of deplorables. You have that epistocratic contempt perfectly captured. Um, so that one of the things that pop in this pickup on is of course, a hostility to so-called political correctness, um, because one manifestation of epistocratic contempt is denouncing people for saying, and often not politically correct language. Um, what they’re saying.
Turi: You talk to a right wing reaction here against. The advances of liberalism, but is there a left-wing one as well? One of the things that we’ve seen in the divide that you’ve just described between those who have been to university, therefore, part of this episode, Socratic elite, and those who, um, have not sort of is a, is a divide between in many cases left and right in both the UK, us and the Western Western Europe.
But what we’re also sort of seeing here is a very large number of people who have been to these universities and do not find the jobs that they might have expected, or at least not the social credit, the F the financial rewards that they would have enjoyed as well and many on the right and center.
Right. We’re also. Identify as sort of hint of anti liberalism in some of those responses on the left as well. I think that the attack on cancel culture de platforming part of these, this cultural war debate would frame a leftist response to liberalism as anti liberal too. Do you buy that?
Timothy Garton Ash: That is definitely an illiberal liberalism, which says that. Only liberal views are allowed in the acceptable public sphere that narrows the so-called Overton window of what can be expressed in public, just to the spectrum of liberal views. As I define it is no liberalism at all, because at the very heart of liberalism is the notion of. Freedom of thought freedom of speech, such that we have the battle of ideas and aren’t of that battle of ideas emerges, made the better ideas win. So that is certainly present. And I think there’s an element of generational change. Many of my students would. Um, be rather suspicious even of the notion of free speech, which three 50 years ago, with a seven for young people from the left and is now a last all too often seen as, as they’re going to vote people from the right. So I think that is going on simultaneously. Something else is going on, namely, that is you say, um, they are a precariat. They didn’t see the certain futures that the generation of the baby boomers soul. And they see in DePaul, the massive inequalities in our society. And therefore they actually embrace socialists. Many of my students would not self identify as social. So I think there’s a two while I think things that often happening at the same time in the same generation.
Turi: So this sort of anti-liberal tendency, um, when it comes to your students, de platforming the cultural Wars, et cetera, it, I wonder whether it parallels or if it doesn’t how it’s dissimilar from trends we see around the world, um, that point to growing youth dissatisfaction with democracy itself. Roberto FOA at Cambridge has produced a very detailed report with the Bennett Institute that, um, which highlights some of these to me, quite shocking figures, something like three quarters of Latin-American young people, uh, deeply dissatisfied with democracy. Do these things go together? Is there a link here? How do you, how, how would you translate this? How, where do you think this comes from? So,
Timothy Garton Ash: I mean, just to be clear, I think the things we’ve just been talking about a much less of a threat to liberal democracy than Donald Trump or Victor or littler and Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, we have to keep the proportions.
And the trick of the populace of course, is to combine in that program. A, a culture, an ideology of the right nationalist, reactionary, conservative with social policies that borrow heavily from the left and said that, you know, that that is the way they managed to win the first election. And then they stopped, um, uh, changing the rules.
So it’s easier to w when the next election, I think that’s important to say, you know, in the first instance, if that’s. That that’s the biggest rap.
Turi: I hear you. And I’d agree with you, but I wonder, given you spent so much time with students, whether there is anything else that you’d flag as being sort of part of the mix, part of the recipe for this growing, growing disillusionment with liberalism and democracy on some level.
Timothy Garton Ash: I mean, I mean, part of it is to be young is to kick against the pricks and. The pricks in this particular context are liberals, right? The dominant mode of established academia, the media to a significant, we have our health societies and certainly their parents is broadly speaking liberal. And in a sense, we’ve had two little battle of ideas over the last, uh, 2025 years. And so it’s, it’s perhaps unsurprising that people want something else and find attractive and interesting. Um, ideas of socialism. I mean, I talked to one of my students the other day and said, who are they reading? And he said, well, I’m reading, you know, Carl Marks and Rose a lot, um, which felt sort of ridiculous in 1989 at the end of communism.
But that’s all back as an, as an alternative to a certain liberal orthodoxy. The other thing, and this I think is one of the things liberals are traditionally good at is, is, is listening to their critics and wanting to hear the strongest version. Of the opposing argument. There’s something Johnsonville was very keen on. And so I read with great care and attention of critiques of liberalism. And there’s a man called Patrick Deneen who wrote a book, which I don’t think it’s terribly good book, but it has one really interesting idea in it. He says the trouble is liberalism became identified with the. Successful the rich, the established and the powerful.
And he said, what we got was liberal ocracy, the rule of the liberals. And that’s, I think what a lot of students and young people in our societies are sensing and liberalism should never be that the whole idea of liberalism was it, it was a political philosophy and practice, which was designed. To help the weekend, poorer members, more vulnerable members of society to have an equal chance.
Turi: It’s fascinating. So on the one hand, we’ve covered now a part of those left behind by. This tremendous progress of liberalism over the course, last 30 years, um, all over the world, big gaps, both obviously rust belt North of England and all those areas untouched by the benefits of globalization and also to a much smaller degree, of course, a young generation.
Who may feel that, um, one, the establishment isn’t doing anything like as good a job as they, they they’d like it to, but also feel disenfranchised from some of the benefits that they’ve all produced for their parents’ generation. That’s in a sense, the left behind there’s also. And you’ve touched on it just now this idea that in fact liberalism may have over succeeded. Um, it’s one of the points you made at the beginning of this podcast. Um, Stephen Holmes, professor Stephen Holmes, who like you spent a lot of time looking deeply at the revolutions in Eastern Europe and the, the sort of narrative of democracy and liberalism in Eastern Europe talks about liberalism’s failure in so far.
Is it preferred hedge money over pluralism? You talk to that little bit with this idea of the liberal lot, Chrissy. Do you think that’s, do you think that’s fad, do you think that actually liberalism just got, and liberals got too happy being too to empower and actually did block up areas of, of debate, which they should have kept open.
Timothy Garton Ash: I think that, and I, that I think to, again, distinct elements to this one is, uh, as it were theoretical liberalism employee realism, uh, two distinct things in a certain tension. With each other, Isaiah Berlin, one of my great mentor Ponce, one of my great mentors, one of his Baptist central intellectual enterprise was to try to combine liberalism and pluralism, which means giving lots of space for non-liberal and even anti-liberal ideas.
And what I’ve argued is if there’s a pluralistic liberalism, Ish benign bell, you know, as I like to say, and then there is a monistic, uh, over systematic centralizing rationalistic, technocratic liberalism, which he traces back to one element of the enlightenment and, and that’s something we always need to look out though to watch out for that ends in liberal ocracy.
Um, the other thing that has gone on is more. As it were practical and political, which is that liberals left liberals of the Tony Blair and bill and Hillary Clinton persuasion got very close to the financial services sector. And to what one might well call us sort of plutocracy and therefore liberalism has become associated with what I genuinely believe. Forgive me if I sound like a revolutionary socialist, but I genuinely believe is a kind of. Corporate plutocratic oligarchic, strangled hold on. Many of our States, the apps, the empty outsize role played by money in American politics, but also in British politics. The fact that a. They slightly dodgy donor to the conservative party is elevated into the house of Lords.
Part of the British parliament of the legislature, despite the house of Lords appointments committee saying that he was not a fit and worthy person to be a member of the APA hive, as that’s a small illustration of that stranglehold,
Turi: that brings us very helpfully to, to some of the. Suggestions that you make for fixing. This problem, perhaps let’s call it less of a problem. And this necessity for a kind of a removal, as you describe it, a renewal of liberalism, a kind of a reassertion of what it really means and how it can really help the largest number of people you take in your essay. You quote Pierre, a French Romanian political philosopher as saying. I hope I get this roughly right. Humanity. Can’t live by Liberty and universality alone, obviously Liberty and universality being too broadly agreed principles of liberalism. And you see, we need to have the fundamental needs for liberalism to properly take hold and to properly deliver its benefits on the one hand, equality and solidarity, some notion of the common good and on the other community and identity. Some sense of belonging, of being part of something bigger than oneself. You frame it even more specifically and you say we all need to become conservative, socialist liberals, Timothy, what do you mean?
Timothy Garton Ash: So I’m riffing off a famous essay written by the Polish philosopher Lesher Kowski, uh, in 1978, uh, how to be a conservative, liberal socialist, and I’m turning it round liberal is now the law. The non conservative and socialists are the adjectives because. Of those two paths of, of ideas, values needs. That you mentioned solidarity and equality typically associated with the left and community and identity more typically with the rights. So what I’m saying is that we liberal small L uh, have to borrow generously from both the left on the right to achieve this renewal of liberalism that we clearly need solidarity and equality. I mean, I absolutely think that we have to look at tax particularly on the very rich, uh, and particularly on wealth, not just on income, because the biggest inequalities in many developed societies now are those of inherited wealth. So one of the ideas I mentioned is a universal. Minimum inheritance that the state should arrange for everyone to have a minimum startup capital, if you will, at the beginning of that professional life, which I think it’s a lovely idea, but also thinking about geographical in a quality and educational inequality, what the current. British government, which I thoroughly dislike, but nonetheless, I think rankly, Kohl’s leveling up. I mean, leveling up is much more of a classic liberal idea. Then leveling down, rough down doors and other migrate mentors and friends used to say, what liberalism wants to create is a common floor from which everyone can rise.
And that goes to issues like what do we do educationally? And in terms of training for the 50% of our societies who aren’t going to university. So that’s a solidarity inequality a bit where you’re. Where you’re getting to ideas, which many would strongly associate with the left on the other hand, community and identity?
One of the things I say Tory is that we liberals cosmopolitan, metropolitan liberals, quite rightly talked a lot about the other half of the world. We didn’t talk enough about the other half of our own societies. We talked a lot about the international community, very little about the national community.
And I actually think that a liberal patriotism, a civic liberal national pride is another very important part of the renewal of the liberalism that we need.
Turi: Can I jump in there? You say, um, You say in your essay, the nation is just too important and too strong in its emotional appeal to be left to the nationalist, which is a lovely phrase. Um, I instinctually recoil from the idea of nationalism at all. I am precisely what you’ve described. Metropolitan cosmopolitan. Multipass holding, multilanguage speaking like you, um, and find it very difficult to box myself into a particular nation. With a Jewish heritage also find that frightening for all sorts of reasons.
Is there not an argument that the kind of Patrick isn’t the kind of civic friendship? This build into, uh, into ideas of common good. Could it not work either at a much larger or a much smaller level? And what I really mean is can one build liberal patriotism in supernational States, which allow for much smaller communities of people to get together with the protections of a larger one. I’m obviously talking about perhaps spokes that we’ve spoken about before the Ottoman empire and very specifically in post-Brexit Britain of the European union,
Timothy Garton Ash: but not instead of. Rather as well as, I mean, if you just look at the COVID pandemic, how everyone, but everyone, even the most integrated countries in Europe instinctively turn to their national government and indeed borders were closed initially all over Europe.
Uh I used to say that the best guarantor we have so far had of individual Liberty is. Constitutional liberal nation state. And I believe that remains true. But there’s a crucial difference between nationalism and patriotism. Patriotism is about the love of your own country or patriotic nationalism adds on the hatred of other people’s countries.
App patriotism allows absolutely for multiple identities. Uh, it allows people to be Londoners English, British. And European Catholic, but also liberal. Um, and those are the two key points. I think we have to insist upon us. In our liberal patriotism, number one that is love of your own country, not hatred of other peoples, which of course there’s what the populist nationalist exploited.
And number two, that it’s not exclusive it’s as well as, and so we have multi-layered identities as I very much do I self identify as people now it says, say the phrase people now use, I identify as, um, an English European. Is there
Turi: something about size does size matter? Is that the reason that Ralph Dahrendorf described this constitutional nations as being the great guarantors of individual Liberty, do you get to a certain size after which it’s just too difficult to look after minorities? Or do you get to a certain smallness after which, um, it’s just too difficult to protect the citizens?
Timothy Garton Ash: Well, Obviously size and distance matters to some extent, I mean, philosophers distinguish between second thin ties there in theory. And clearly my ties to my wife and children are set out and those two people in a. You know, I’ll come on girly, but I don’t know. I think size is a crucial thing because actually you can have strong patriotic identities in very large countries. Like the United States. I’ve never forgotten. He reading the story about, uh, an American woman who was actually freezing to death on a mountain side. Uh, when they found her, she was, she was almost gone and in her. Uh, desperate state, she kept repeating three things. Don’t leave me. Why are you doing this to me? And I am an American and to sort of the Jeep history thing and her identity at that desk store was I am an American. And so I think that you can have quite deep patriotic identities in quite launch countries.
Russia would be another example, China, India. Again, I think it is about the organization of the political community.
Turi: America is one of those countries, I think, of France and China, and I’m sure many others with a verbalized explicit description of what it is Britain, for example is very much not that it’s a nation of mores, perhaps rather than a nation of constant circulation of constitution. Is there a difference between the kind of patriotism. Solicited by one versus the patriotism citizens by the other.
Timothy Garton Ash: You will remember that once upon a time, but his prime minister, Gordon Brown don’t enterprise to define British identity. And that always seemed to me in itself about the British activity, right? Because the point of our Britishness is precisely that it’s this. Baggy duffle coat of rather undefined identity. All you have to do is to be able to talk about the weather and vaguely now the queen and maybe football. Um, I think he, honestly, I think it comes in multiple variations. I mean, I, I think it is true that new States.
And very large States tend to need more explicit codes. Justice. I’m told that companies after mergers, when they become much larger need explicit codes. Um, but what I think is, is key here is the relationship of rights. And duties, you give something to the national political community and you receive something back from the national political community. And the challenge for supranational communities like the European union is to keep that balance. Right. So one of the big problems with the Euro zone is it felt it was out of kilter for people who were suffering in the, as they’re in crisis in Greece or other South European countries.
Turi: Right. Okay. So with all this, are you optimistic of the, over the next 10 years, you talked about the 21st century as many do is the century of China and liberalism survive. And then world order in which it’s not the most powerful ideology, neither necessarily financially, nor even. Militarily where China is promoting. As you say, a, a model of modernism, that’s very, very different from the liberal one and doing so very successfully across, um, the middle East, Southeast Asia Africa,
Timothy Garton Ash: um,
Turi: can liberalism survive? How does liberalism survive in that, in this sort of multipolar world? Again?
Timothy Garton Ash: So my formula is always the famous. Pessimism of the intellect optimism of the will. Because intellectually for the reasons you have given and add to that climate change and the drama that is likely to unleash in our societies and possibly the need for much more compulsive compulsion to combat it and something, you know, very well Turia, which is a digital revolution.
Now leading on to AI. Which is another huge challenge. So intellectually one could have quite good grounds for pessimism, but the pessimism would become a self-fulfilling prophecy. If one didn’t have the optimism of the will, if one didn’t believe that some, that individual freedom was something uniquely valuable, which it’s worth fighting for. And that self-belief, that will. Is a strength in itself, uh, is one of the great strengths of liberalism that people actually believe in it and believe their thing is worth fighting for. Um, and where I see real signs for optimism is in societies, which have been unfree for some time. So the most moving and most courageous movements for freedom.
Uh, now in Belarus once called the last European dictatorship where we’ve seen the most amazing popular movement for freedom in freezing conditions against fierce repression going on for months in Hong Kong. I think now in Russia, we were speaking as Alex, a Navalny has just returned to Russia. And so I think there is as well as. Other patents in history, an element of a kind of wave movement, almost a cyclical movement, where they turned to dictatorship in time, generates its own resistance. So people start yelling again for freedom as embeddables add in Russia as in Hong Kong and by the way, to a significant degree in China. And I would add one other thing to that.
You know, I’ve now been in two great universities for many decades, Oxford and Stanford. In that time, I’ve had so many students from all over the world, including China and Russia, fantastic students. Who’ve loved being in, you know, CRE lively universities in a free country. And while they don’t all immediately become dissidents, they’re all waiting that. And when the change begins to come. Believe me, they will be on the streets and in the institutions, um, moving the dial back towards freedom.
Turi: Uh, a parallel question to that would be in the aftermath of a failed coup if we think that’s what it was, or at least an attempt to take the capital on the capital in the U S do you think that the, that America, which has led the cause of liberalism for the last hundred years or so?
Do you think it starts to take a back seat? One? I suppose, first question, do you think it recovers from this quite extraordinary four years of Trump presidency and whatever is in store for us in its aftermath. And do you think that the mantle of liberalism moves, is it shift? Does it become European again or to your point, is it actually picked up and most developed in these parts of the world where its absence is most keenly felt.
Timothy Garton Ash: you’re absolutely right to distinguish between those two things, democracies recovery in the United States and the United States as to use the cliche lead of the well for the first, uh, it, it seemed to me that American democracy has survived an enormous challenge. Arguably, one of the most serious challenges in its entirety. History it is coming through, but if you look at the problems, structural problems of the U S system from a deeply dysfunctional political system. With the separation of powers becoming, you know, a blockage to reform to the most expensive, but by certainly not the most effective health system in the world to its battered infrastructure.
To it’s very poor, uh, primary and secondary public education and the most acute form of the two realities problem. The worlds of media and social media separated out into two competing realities. So the tens of millions of Americans can actually believe that Trump. Won the election or at least the fair election was fraudulent.
If you look at all that accumulation of problems, it’s very hard to see the United States come charging back as it did after Vietnam and Watergate. Let me remind you when the reputation of the United States was. You know, with very low. And that means that I don’t think the city upon a Hill, the leader of the free world, the shining model democracy in which Joe Biden seems to believe is coming back.
Anytime soon we need the United States still, we need a strong liberal democratic Europe, but actually the key players, what I call in my book, free speech, the swing States will be countries like Australia. Japan and India, the democracies actually in Asia and the other half of the world. And I would say also countries like Brazil, maybe South Africa. And so my vision for the future is that of a West that goes beyond the traditional West. If what we really need to look for is a network of democracies around the world, in which countries, outside the traditional core West. We’ll be at least as important as the United States or poorer Brexit, Britain.
Turi: And I think many thanks indeed, for taking us on this extraordinary to have the resolve liberalism in, uh, in 2021. Um, it’s been an immense pleasure talking to you. Thank you for taking the time
Timothy Garton Ash: Great pleasure